Winter Banter Thread

[LibertyBell]

15 hours ago, vegan_edible said:

Kansas is close 2nd 

The Dakotas are right up there too

[LibertyBell]

On 2/13/2023 at 9:27 AM, Volcanic Winter said:

Wife and I are up in Danbury CT area. Really nice up here. Perfect, except for the bare ass ground .

Definitely expected snow on the ground when we planned this trip, we’re also nearly one thousand feet elevation in this park, too. 

You know this winter sucks when there’s not a single pile of snow anywhere near here. At least we’re having a fun time despite.

who was more sad at the lack of snow lol

 

[Brasiluvsnow]

This winter sucks ass,,,,,,enjoy Spring today and Thursday folks unreal

[JustinRP37]

Good lord this winter is by far the most ridiculous excuse for a season. Even people that hate winter are nervous now. It legit feels like we should all be going to Yankee Stadium and Citi Field. Why bother flying to Florida and Arizona for spring training. 

[rclab]

6 hours ago, LibertyBell said:

who was more sad at the lack of snow lol

 

Probably both, Liberty. Anyway, I doubt the snow could have lasted in the warm glow of such a partnership. Stay well, as always ….

[Nibor]

36 minutes ago, rclab said:

Probably both, Liberty. Anyway, I doubt the snow could have lasted in the warm glow of such a partnership. Stay well, as always ….

 

[Brasiluvsnow]

On 2/13/2023 at 6:26 PM, Will - Rutgers said:

idk who would dare attack ohio but i trust the military will pay them back dearly

 

Norfolk Southern, whose top shareholders incl. BlackRock & Vanguard, told the gov’t how they wanted this disaster handled = This is something to think about long and hard
 

[LibertyBell]

3 hours ago, JustinRP37 said:

Good lord this winter is by far the most ridiculous excuse for a season. Even people that hate winter are nervous now. It legit feels like we should all be going to Yankee Stadium and Citi Field. Why bother flying to Florida and Arizona for spring training. 

with all the toxic chemical spills going on, humanity is doing a lot of things wrong on this planet.

Instead of looking for intelligent life elsewhere in the universe, we need to wonder whether it even exists on earth.

You mentioned Arizona, there is yet another toxic cloud over I-10 there

[LibertyBell]

2 minutes ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

 

Norfolk Southern, whose top shareholders incl. BlackRock & Vanguard, told the gov’t how they wanted this disaster handled = This is something to think about longboard's and hard
 

When those regulations got rolled back that rail company saved 2 billion dollars-- hopefully they lose more than that in lawsuits.

[Brasiluvsnow]

14 hours ago, LibertyBell said:

When those regulations got rolled back that rail company saved 2 billion dollars-- hopefully they lose more than that in lawsuits.

Liberty, as was the case with many other stories it took the media over a week to report on this just as they have not reported on so many other things. Hopefully they are ALL held accountable. In other news this winter sucks on so many levels

[LibertyBell]

4 minutes ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

Liberty, as was the case with many other stories it took the media over a week to report on this just as they have not reported on so many other things. Hopefully they are ALL held accountable. In other news this winter sucks on so many levels

Yeah and I didn't even know this happened until someone told me I should look it up.

From 1996

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weyauwega,_Wisconsin,_derailment

The Weyauwega derailment was a railroad accident that occurred in Weyauwega, Wisconsin, United States, in the early morning hours of March 4, 1996. The derailed train was carrying a large quantity of hazardous material, which immediately caught fire. The fire, which involved the train cars and an adjacent feed mill, burned for more than two weeks after the actual derailment, resulting in the emergency evacuation of 2,300 people for 18 days, including the entire city of Weyauwega, with about 1,700 evacuees.

Derailment and fire[edit]

At approximately 5:49 am, an 81-car Wisconsin Central train traveling from Stevens Point, Wisconsin, to Neenah, Wisconsin, approached the city of Weyauwega at 48.3 miles per hour (77.7 km/h), traveling on a downward grade. The locomotives and the first 16 cars of the train passed a switch without incident, after which the seventeenth through fifty-third cars behind them derailed at the location of the switch, at 5:49:32 AM. A subsequent NTSB investigation found the cause of the derailment to be a broken rail within the switch that was the result of an undetected bolt hole fracture.[1] The derailed cars included seven tank cars of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), seven tank cars of propane and two tank cars of sodium hydroxide. The derailment ruptured three of the tank cars, spilling both LPG and propane, which immediately ignited. The conductor of the train cut the train after the first nine cars, and proceeded onward 1.5 miles (2.4 km).

When the local fire crew arrived on the scene five minutes after the derailment, fireballs were exploding up to 300 feet (90 m) high that were visible for nearly 13 miles (21 km). Fire spread to a nearby feed mill and storage building that were both difficult to access by the fire crew because the derailed train was blocking the grade crossing. High tension power lines were also torn down by the derailment, which caused secondary electrical fires. In total, seven of the tank cars of LPG and propane leaked, and the two sodium hydroxide tank cars leaked their contents. Electricity and natural gas service to 25% of the city of Weyauwega was disrupted, and city water services had to be shut off because of a rupture in a water main.

[Brasiluvsnow]

Liberty and others this is the best analysis thus far that I have seen on what has taken place in Ohio well worth the time to read

https://twitter.com/rycunni/status/1625290671799033856?s=20

[North and West]

.

[LibertyBell]

2 hours ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

Liberty and others this is the best analysis thus far that I have seen on what has taken place in Ohio well worth the time to read

https://twitter.com/rycunni/status/1625290671799033856?s=20

Thats an awesome thread I read it to the end and when he concluded about the government and media response leaving a lot to be desired

[Brasiluvsnow]

4 hours ago, LibertyBell said:

Thats an awesome thread I read it to the end and when he concluded about the government and media response leaving a lot to be desired

agreed, it was very insightful thats why I shared it

[USCG RS]

On 2/15/2023 at 1:12 PM, LibertyBell said:

Thats an awesome thread I read it to the end and when he concluded about the government and media response leaving a lot to be desired

 

19 hours ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

agreed, it was very insightful thats why I shared it

Inciteful - Yes. But still missing a plethora of things - some of which I believe could provide even further light on the situation. 

1) You had a local Fire Dept, ill-equipped to handle an actual Haz Mat Emergency. While all FDs are trained on Hazmat, etc.. the smaller the Dept, the less training you have for a major Haz Mat incident. Even Class 1 (ISO Class) Depts are many times ill prepared to handle the immediate aftermath of a Haz Mat incident of this scope. The immediate responding FD/EMS/PD was from a town of 5K persons with -I believe- an all-volunteer Dept. These volunteers work other jobs for a living and dedicate their time to assist the community. As such, they are rarely trained to handle anything outside of a "routine" emergency (Ie - House Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident/Crash, Medical, Etc). Compound that with the fact that this small Dept likely has little in the way of funding for these types of emergencies and well - You're crippled out of the gate. 

2) All emergencies are Inherently local. This is what is taught -and I believe to be true - in the National Response Framework (NRF), which are the guidelines provided to all local Emergency Managers for how to react to all Emergencies. So how does this affect East Palestine, Ohio? 2 Ways. First, we already discussed that the responding Dept is ill equipped and funded for this type of emergency. Secondly, the NRF would then provide a manner in which to scale up the Response. So, the Incident Commander (IC) -Sometimes a Unified Commander (UC) depending on the set up of the response- has to quickly determine the nature of the incident and how to properly scale; Ie what is needed to scale. In this case, you would need to ascertain the scope of the Incident, what is the cause of the fire, how you are going to need to respond to the fire and what other hazards are around. A seasoned IC can relatively quickly ascertain this, however, you have a unique situation (Serious HazMat) with a likely skeleton crew (Volunteers who have to respond during working hours) with a crew that may or may not have ever even been trained for this type of incident (and by training - I mean actual training, not mandated slide training). Therefore, the IC is at an immediate disadvantage and is incredibly outmatched with regards to resources needed. So, we scale up. The closest ISO 2 dept (ISO is 1-10, with 1 being the best and most ready to respond - 2 is a pretty good ISO) is Youngstown, approximately 20 miles away. Then you have Pittsburgh (ISO-1) about 50 miles away and Cleveland (ISO-2) about 85 miles away. This leads to my next point;

3) The Depts listed above are well funded and equipped to handle these types of incidents (or as well as a local FD can be), however you have several issues. First, it is going to take time to mobilize these units. Dispatch has to liaison with these Depts and explain the situation. Assuming there are Mutual Aid Contracts in place, the process is somewhat streamlined. Without these contracts (50/50 chance), the process becomes further complicated. No contract means no formalized manner in which the mutual aid unit responds, no promise of response, and most importantly - the mutual aid Dept may not have a standardized manner in which they can scale themselves up to meet the need of the requesting Dept. However, let us assume that the mutual aid Dept. has an agreement. The mutual aid Dept. is going to have to call in reserves/persons not working. Perhaps, one unit can be immediately spared, however, remember, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Etc, are all busy Depts and they are scheduled to handle their own depts issues -with little wiggle room to spare. Now, most mutual aid agreements are penned based on the idea that a large fire (Non-Hazmat), large Motor Vehicle Crash, etc has occurred. These agreements are not penned with the idea of a multi-state Haz Mat disaster in mind. It is not that this is never thought of, it is simply the fact that a response of this magnitude is going to need a plethora of depts (National, State, Local, Federal & even Private). But I digress, let us pull it back from this Rabbit hole for a minute. Mutual Aids are going to take time. Haz Mat Mutual Aids are going to take longer; and this is not even mentioning the Federal Mutual Aid Response needed. So what happens now? You have an IC on the scene of a nightmare, with very little information, significantly limited resources and a ticking time bomb. Let us go to the next point.

4) Information. Information is scarce when you first pull up. It has likely been dispatched as a train derailment. Beyond that -most likely- the First Responders are gathering the info on their own. So, Responders pull up to a scene. You have a fire and you have a massive derailment. We do not know what chemicals we have, what is burning and how many injured/casualties. First responders are looking for placards, however, they may not even be able to find them at first. Remember, this is a derailment. the placards could be damaged, missing, destroyed, obscured, etc. Then, you have to communicate with the hauling company, which also takes time. What is on this train? How many of the substances are on this train? Etc. Etc. Etc. While the placards - if located- will tell you the substances, it will tell you how much. Likewise, the manifest is on every train. However, again, this is a derailment. Is the conductor alive? Can they reach the cargo manifest? Is it damaged. Heck, is it complete (I have been on many scenes where, well, let's just say humans cut corners and/or make mistakes). Information is scarce. That withstanding, the Thread in question explains very well how the information is obtained and how it works from here with that regard. 

5) Humans are responding. Humans whose family live in the town they are trying to protect. Humans are outmatched, underfunded, overworked, and not even paid. Humans, who are fighting panic. We all become scared and we all fight panic. Panic is not what the movies portray it as - panic is a survival instinct. However, what overcomes panic? Training. Training that is minimal at best. I bring this up not to fault the responders -they are, well.. amazing humans- however, I bring this up because too many Emergency Managers remove this element from the equation. Emotions are running very high and this is going to cause somewhat of a response lag because there is little training to overcome it (specific training for this type of incident), there is little information and their family is in immediate danger. It is not to fault the responders, it is simply a reality that further complicates an already horrific situation.  

So now let's take all of the above information into account. There is a plethora of aspects to this type of event, however, the Thread was addressing why they let it burn. Part of the reason this was allowed to burn was simply due to the fact that resources to fight the fire were not available, information to determine the best course forward was slim and -most importantly- the life of the responders must also be taken into account. First Responders are scarce. We all want to believe that there is an endless supply of emergency personnel, but the truth is that emergency personnel are scarce. The time it takes to train these personnel is intensive and it takes even longer to season a responder. As such, Emergency Personnel lives are taken into account -or should be- in all responses.

The main reason, however, was there was simply no other choice. The population likes to believe that all emergencies can be tamed and brought under control with the proper resources. Likewise, the population tends to believe that resources for handling emergencies are unlimited. Neither of these assumptions are even remotely true. The truth is -sometimes- you have to make very tough decisions. Tough decisions such as sacrifice a 500M radius area to save a mile radius area. Sometimes these decisions are simply due to a lack of resources. Sometimes it is due to the fact that the nature of the emergency was simply too damaging. 

Either way, the full scope of this disaster is not even close to being understood.

 

 

[Rtd208]

Singing.

Done.

[IrishRob17]

On 1/12/2023 at 6:04 AM, Rtd208 said:

Singing begins.

 

 

37 minutes ago, Rtd208 said:

Singing.

Done.

Noted…again

[coastalplainsnowman]

If this lack of winter keeps up, and doesn't happen again in future years to this extent for awhile, do you think this season will be referred to as 'The Year Without a Winter' or do the Christmas week cold snap and the super-brief recent cold snap disqualify it?

For comparison, looks like the 1816 Year without a Summer did have some brief bouts of 90+ weather, so maybe it wouldn't be disqualifying.

[JustinRP37]

57 minutes ago, IrishRob17 said:

 

Noted…again

We had a few intermissions. She had to warm up again  

[Stormlover74]

56 minutes ago, coastalplainsnowman said:

If this lack of winter keeps up, and doesn't happen again in future years to this extent for awhile, do you think this season will be referred to as 'The Year Without a Winter' or do the Christmas week cold snap and the super-brief recent cold snap disqualify it?

For comparison, looks like the 1816 Year without a Summer did have some brief bouts of 90+ weather, so maybe it wouldn't be disqualifying.

Less than 1" of snow qualifies 

[psv88]

1 hour ago, coastalplainsnowman said:

If this lack of winter keeps up, and doesn't happen again in future years to this extent for awhile, do you think this season will be referred to as 'The Year Without a Winter' or do the Christmas week cold snap and the super-brief recent cold snap disqualify it?

For comparison, looks like the 1816 Year without a Summer did have some brief bouts of 90+ weather, so maybe it wouldn't be disqualifying.

Definitely the year without a winter 

[LibertyBell]

5 hours ago, USCG RS said:

 

Inciteful - Yes. But still missing a plethora of things - some of which I believe could provide even further light on the situation. 

1) You had a local Fire Dept, ill-equipped to handle an actual Haz Mat Emergency. While all FDs are trained on Hazmat, etc.. the smaller the Dept, the less training you have for a major Haz Mat incident. Even Class 1 (ISO Class) Depts are many times ill prepared to handle the immediate aftermath of a Haz Mat incident of this scope. The immediate responding FD/EMS/PD was from a town of 5K persons with -I believe- an all-volunteer Dept. These volunteers work other jobs for a living and dedicate their time to assist the community. As such, they are rarely trained to handle anything outside of a "routine" emergency (Ie - House Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident/Crash, Medical, Etc). Compound that with the fact that this small Dept likely has little in the way of funding for these types of emergencies and well - You're crippled out of the gate. 

2) All emergencies are Inherently local. This is what is taught -and I believe to be true - in the National Response Framework (NRF), which are the guidelines provided to all local Emergency Managers for how to react to all Emergencies. So how does this affect East Palestine, Ohio? 2 Ways. First, we already discussed that the responding Dept is ill equipped and funded for this type of emergency. Secondly, the NRF would then provide a manner in which to scale up the Response. So, the Incident Commander (IC) -Sometimes a Unified Commander (UC) depending on the set up of the response- has to quickly determine the nature of the incident and how to properly scale; Ie what is needed to scale. In this case, you would need to ascertain the scope of the Incident, what is the cause of the fire, how you are going to need to respond to the fire and what other hazards are around. A seasoned IC can relatively quickly ascertain this, however, you have a unique situation (Serious HazMat) with a likely skeleton crew (Volunteers who have to respond during working hours) with a crew that may or may not have ever even been trained for this type of incident (and by training - I mean actual training, not mandated slide training). Therefore, the IC is at an immediate disadvantage and is incredibly outmatched with regards to resources needed. So, we scale up. The closest ISO 2 dept (ISO is 1-10, with 1 being the best and most ready to respond - 2 is a pretty good ISO) is Youngstown, approximately 20 miles away. Then you have Pittsburgh (ISO-1) about 50 miles away and Cleveland (ISO-2) about 85 miles away. This leads to my next point;

3) The Depts listed above are well funded and equipped to handle these types of incidents (or as well as a local FD can be), however you have several issues. First, it is going to take time to mobilize these units. Dispatch has to liaison with these Depts and explain the situation. Assuming there are Mutual Aid Contracts in place, the process is somewhat streamlined. Without these contracts (50/50 chance), the process becomes further complicated. No contract means no formalized manner in which the mutual aid unit responds, no promise of response, and most importantly - the mutual aid Dept may not have a standardized manner in which they can scale themselves up to meet the need of the requesting Dept. However, let us assume that the mutual aid Dept. has an agreement. The mutual aid Dept. is going to have to call in reserves/persons not working. Perhaps, one unit can be immediately spared, however, remember, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Etc, are all busy Depts and they are scheduled to handle their own depts issues -with little wiggle room to spare. Now, most mutual aid agreements are penned based on the idea that a large fire (Non-Hazmat), large Motor Vehicle Crash, etc has occurred. These agreements are not penned with the idea of a multi-state Haz Mat disaster in mind. It is not that this is never thought of, it is simply the fact that a response of this magnitude is going to need a plethora of depts (National, State, Local, Federal & even Private). But I digress, let us pull it back from this Rabbit hole for a minute. Mutual Aids are going to take time. Haz Mat Mutual Aids are going to take longer; and this is not even mentioning the Federal Mutual Aid Response needed. So what happens now? You have an IC on the scene of a nightmare, with very little information, significantly limited resources and a ticking time bomb. Let us go to the next point.

4) Information. Information is scarce when you first pull up. It has likely been dispatched as a train derailment. Beyond that -most likely- the First Responders are gathering the info on their own. So, Responders pull up to a scene. You have a fire and you have a massive derailment. We do not know what chemicals we have, what is burning and how many injured/casualties. First responders are looking for placards, however, they may not even be able to find them at first. Remember, this is a derailment. the placards could be damaged, missing, destroyed, obscured, etc. Then, you have to communicate with the hauling company, which also takes time. What is on this train? How many of the substances are on this train? Etc. Etc. Etc. While the placards - if located- will tell you the substances, it will tell you how much. Likewise, the manifest is on every train. However, again, this is a derailment. Is the conductor alive? Can they reach the cargo manifest? Is it damaged. Heck, is it complete (I have been on many scenes where, well, let's just say humans cut corners and/or make mistakes). Information is scarce. That withstanding, the Thread in question explains very well how the information is obtained and how it works from here with that regard. 

5) Humans are responding. Humans whose family live in the town they are trying to protect. Humans are outmatched, underfunded, overworked, and not even paid. Humans, who are fighting panic. We all become scared and we all fight panic. Panic is not what the movies portray it as - panic is a survival instinct. However, what overcomes panic? Training. Training that is minimal at best. I bring this up not to fault the responders -they are, well.. amazing humans- however, I bring this up because too many Emergency Managers remove this element from the equation. Emotions are running very high and this is going to cause somewhat of a response lag because there is little training to overcome it (specific training for this type of incident), there is little information and their family is in immediate danger. It is not to fault the responders, it is simply a reality that further complicates an already horrific situation.  

So now let's take all of the above information into account. There is a plethora of aspects to this type of event, however, the Thread was addressing why they let it burn. Part of the reason this was allowed to burn was simply due to the fact that resources to fight the fire were not available, information to determine the best course forward was slim and -most importantly- the life of the responders must also be taken into account. First Responders are scarce. We all want to believe that there is an endless supply of emergency personnel, but the truth is that emergency personnel are scarce. The time it takes to train these personnel is intensive and it takes even longer to season a responder. As such, Emergency Personnel lives are taken into account -or should be- in all responses.

The main reason, however, was there was simply no other choice. The population likes to believe that all emergencies can be tamed and brought under control with the proper resources. Likewise, the population tends to believe that resources for handling emergencies are unlimited. Neither of these assumptions are even remotely true. The truth is -sometimes- you have to make very tough decisions. Tough decisions such as sacrifice a 500M radius area to save a mile radius area. Sometimes these decisions are simply due to a lack of resources. Sometimes it is due to the fact that the nature of the emergency was simply too damaging. 

Either way, the full scope of this disaster is not even close to being understood.

 

 

I found it really alarming when I found out Norfolk Southern is so happy they are now allowed to make trains longer than they should be and that particular train had a nickname that made it pretty clear they knew it was a ticking time bomb.

They fully deserve the incoming lawsuits.

[Brasiluvsnow]

6 hours ago, USCG RS said:

 

Inciteful - Yes. But still missing a plethora of things - some of which I believe could provide even further light on the situation. 

1) You had a local Fire Dept, ill-equipped to handle an actual Haz Mat Emergency. While all FDs are trained on Hazmat, etc.. the smaller the Dept, the less training you have for a major Haz Mat incident. Even Class 1 (ISO Class) Depts are many times ill prepared to handle the immediate aftermath of a Haz Mat incident of this scope. The immediate responding FD/EMS/PD was from a town of 5K persons with -I believe- an all-volunteer Dept. These volunteers work other jobs for a living and dedicate their time to assist the community. As such, they are rarely trained to handle anything outside of a "routine" emergency (Ie - House Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident/Crash, Medical, Etc). Compound that with the fact that this small Dept likely has little in the way of funding for these types of emergencies and well - You're crippled out of the gate. 

2) All emergencies are Inherently local. This is what is taught -and I believe to be true - in the National Response Framework (NRF), which are the guidelines provided to all local Emergency Managers for how to react to all Emergencies. So how does this affect East Palestine, Ohio? 2 Ways. First, we already discussed that the responding Dept is ill equipped and funded for this type of emergency. Secondly, the NRF would then provide a manner in which to scale up the Response. So, the Incident Commander (IC) -Sometimes a Unified Commander (UC) depending on the set up of the response- has to quickly determine the nature of the incident and how to properly scale; Ie what is needed to scale. In this case, you would need to ascertain the scope of the Incident, what is the cause of the fire, how you are going to need to respond to the fire and what other hazards are around. A seasoned IC can relatively quickly ascertain this, however, you have a unique situation (Serious HazMat) with a likely skeleton crew (Volunteers who have to respond during working hours) with a crew that may or may not have ever even been trained for this type of incident (and by training - I mean actual training, not mandated slide training). Therefore, the IC is at an immediate disadvantage and is incredibly outmatched with regards to resources needed. So, we scale up. The closest ISO 2 dept (ISO is 1-10, with 1 being the best and most ready to respond - 2 is a pretty good ISO) is Youngstown, approximately 20 miles away. Then you have Pittsburgh (ISO-1) about 50 miles away and Cleveland (ISO-2) about 85 miles away. This leads to my next point;

3) The Depts listed above are well funded and equipped to handle these types of incidents (or as well as a local FD can be), however you have several issues. First, it is going to take time to mobilize these units. Dispatch has to liaison with these Depts and explain the situation. Assuming there are Mutual Aid Contracts in place, the process is somewhat streamlined. Without these contracts (50/50 chance), the process becomes further complicated. No contract means no formalized manner in which the mutual aid unit responds, no promise of response, and most importantly - the mutual aid Dept may not have a standardized manner in which they can scale themselves up to meet the need of the requesting Dept. However, let us assume that the mutual aid Dept. has an agreement. The mutual aid Dept. is going to have to call in reserves/persons not working. Perhaps, one unit can be immediately spared, however, remember, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Etc, are all busy Depts and they are scheduled to handle their own depts issues -with little wiggle room to spare. Now, most mutual aid agreements are penned based on the idea that a large fire (Non-Hazmat), large Motor Vehicle Crash, etc has occurred. These agreements are not penned with the idea of a multi-state Haz Mat disaster in mind. It is not that this is never thought of, it is simply the fact that a response of this magnitude is going to need a plethora of depts (National, State, Local, Federal & even Private). But I digress, let us pull it back from this Rabbit hole for a minute. Mutual Aids are going to take time. Haz Mat Mutual Aids are going to take longer; and this is not even mentioning the Federal Mutual Aid Response needed. So what happens now? You have an IC on the scene of a nightmare, with very little information, significantly limited resources and a ticking time bomb. Let us go to the next point.

4) Information. Information is scarce when you first pull up. It has likely been dispatched as a train derailment. Beyond that -most likely- the First Responders are gathering the info on their own. So, Responders pull up to a scene. You have a fire and you have a massive derailment. We do not know what chemicals we have, what is burning and how many injured/casualties. First responders are looking for placards, however, they may not even be able to find them at first. Remember, this is a derailment. the placards could be damaged, missing, destroyed, obscured, etc. Then, you have to communicate with the hauling company, which also takes time. What is on this train? How many of the substances are on this train? Etc. Etc. Etc. While the placards - if located- will tell you the substances, it will tell you how much. Likewise, the manifest is on every train. However, again, this is a derailment. Is the conductor alive? Can they reach the cargo manifest? Is it damaged. Heck, is it complete (I have been on many scenes where, well, let's just say humans cut corners and/or make mistakes). Information is scarce. That withstanding, the Thread in question explains very well how the information is obtained and how it works from here with that regard. 

5) Humans are responding. Humans whose family live in the town they are trying to protect. Humans are outmatched, underfunded, overworked, and not even paid. Humans, who are fighting panic. We all become scared and we all fight panic. Panic is not what the movies portray it as - panic is a survival instinct. However, what overcomes panic? Training. Training that is minimal at best. I bring this up not to fault the responders -they are, well.. amazing humans- however, I bring this up because too many Emergency Managers remove this element from the equation. Emotions are running very high and this is going to cause somewhat of a response lag because there is little training to overcome it (specific training for this type of incident), there is little information and their family is in immediate danger. It is not to fault the responders, it is simply a reality that further complicates an already horrific situation.  

So now let's take all of the above information into account. There is a plethora of aspects to this type of event, however, the Thread was addressing why they let it burn. Part of the reason this was allowed to burn was simply due to the fact that resources to fight the fire were not available, information to determine the best course forward was slim and -most importantly- the life of the responders must also be taken into account. First Responders are scarce. We all want to believe that there is an endless supply of emergency personnel, but the truth is that emergency personnel are scarce. The time it takes to train these personnel is intensive and it takes even longer to season a responder. As such, Emergency Personnel lives are taken into account -or should be- in all responses.

The main reason, however, was there was simply no other choice. The population likes to believe that all emergencies can be tamed and brought under control with the proper resources. Likewise, the population tends to believe that resources for handling emergencies are unlimited. Neither of these assumptions are even remotely true. The truth is -sometimes- you have to make very tough decisions. Tough decisions such as sacrifice a 500M radius area to save a mile radius area. Sometimes these decisions are simply due to a lack of resources. Sometimes it is due to the fact that the nature of the emergency was simply too damaging. 

Either way, the full scope of this disaster is not even close to being understood.

 

 

RS, thanks for your input it's appreciated,,,,,5 days after this derailment occurred  ( if not sooner ) officials were telling and encouraging residents " it's ok to return home " = insanity. It has been almost 2 weeks and those people in Ohio are being lied to.

[LibertyBell]

2 hours ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

RS, thanks for your input it's appreciated,,,,,5 days after this derailment occurred  ( if not sooner ) officials were telling and encouraging residents " it's ok to return home " = insanity. It has been almost 2 weeks and those people in Ohio are being lied to.

They should instead tell them about the ones that had to go to the hospital because of respiratory distress, including an entire family.

[Brasiluvsnow]

https://twitter.com/TheChiefNerd/status/1626400083313930240?s=20

[snowman19]

@donsutherland1 This guy is a total crackpot. -5F DC-BOS from 3/1 - 4/15 along with 20+ inches of snow in NYC

[donsutherland1]

2 hours ago, snowman19 said:

@donsutherland1 This guy is a total crackpot. -5F DC-BOS from 3/1 - 4/15 along with 20+ inches of snow in NYC

The extreme forecast appears to be a last-ditch swing for the fences in what has been a disastrous winter forecast in among the warmest winters on record.  Such tweets undermine the credibility of profession, because of the visibility and attention they garner.

With respect to the -5° anomaly/20"+ snowfall idea, I posted previously on that matter for NYC. Overall, the probability of such an outcome remains exceptionally low. There is no support on the most recent ECMWF weeklies or CFSv2 for the kind of sustained cold required.

The verification tweet for mid-November through December is not exactly accurate. He referred to "big end-game, cold." Yet, the area of 1° or more below normal anomalies for this period was quite small. Had there not been the short-lived severe Arctic blast in late December, that area would have been even smaller. Nevertheless, the anomalies fall far short of what was described.

With regard to his "wishcast" tweet, there is a material omission. He had expected severe cold for the January 10-30 period.

The January 10-30, 2023 outcome could not have been more different from his idea:

Boston: Mean Temperature: 37.5° (8th warmest); Snowfall: 6.4"
New York City: Mean Temperature: 42.0° (3rd warmest); Snowfall: Trace
Philadelphia: Mean Temperature: 41.6° (7th warmest); Snowfall: None
Washington, DC: Mean Temperature: 43.1° (tied 12th warmest); Snowfall: Trace

All four cities wound up with among their warmest Januaries on record. Boston (5th warmest), New York City (1st warmest), Philadelphia (2nd warmest), and Washington, DC (3rd warmest).

Why have things gone so badly? Two possible issues may be involved:

1) His "analog" method

2) His approach to using the guidance

Analogs can provide useful insight when three conditions exist: they are selected in an objective fashion (different people should be able to reproduce them from a consistent methodology), their limitations (lack of synoptic scale value, sample size, uncertainty) are respected, and reasonable comparability exists (relatively stable climate) across the period of time. Today, the climate is warming and it is notably warmer than it was even a few decades ago. The dynamic warming and extent of warming that has occurred have undermined analog comparability and reduced valid analog pools to very small sample sizes.

His approach to using models and ensembles is flawed. He has often suggested that he arrives at conclusions and then chooses the guidance that favors those conclusions. Two or three decades ago when the guidance had much less skill, the hazards of that approach would have been less evident. The noise of model error would have drowned out the error from a flawed approach to using the models. Today, the hazards of that flawed approach are inescapable. In general, one should look at the evidence, including the guidance, and only then reach conclusions. One should not reach preconceived conclusions and then essentially filter evidence simply because it confirms one's ideas. Confirmation bias is lethal to good analyses and decision-making. It also undermines the possibility of utilizing lessons from post-verification assessments.

Overall, long-range forecasting remains a low-skill endeavor. However, an inherently flawed approach to forecasting can greatly increase the frequency and magnitude of one's errors. I suspect that's the bigger story here.

 

[LibertyBell]

43 minutes ago, donsutherland1 said:

The extreme forecast appears to be a last-ditch swing for the fences in what has been a disastrous winter forecast in among the warmest winters on record.  Such tweets undermine the credibility of profession, because of the visibility and attention they garner.

With respect to the -5° anomaly/20"+ snowfall idea, I posted previously on that matter for NYC. Overall, the probability of such an outcome remains exceptionally low. There is no support on the most recent ECMWF weeklies or CFSv2 for the kind of sustained cold required.

The verification tweet for mid-November through December is not exactly accurate. He referred to "big end-game, cold." Yet, the area of 1° or more below normal anomalies for this period was quite small. Had there not been the short-lived severe Arctic blast in late December, that area would have been even smaller. Nevertheless, the anomalies fall far short of what was described.

With regard to his "wishcast" tweet, there is a material omission. He had expected severe cold for the January 10-30 period.

The January 10-30, 2023 outcome could not have been more different from his idea:

Boston: Mean Temperature: 37.5° (8th warmest); Snowfall: 6.4"
New York City: Mean Temperature: 42.0° (3rd warmest); Snowfall: Trace
Philadelphia: Mean Temperature: 41.6° (7th warmest); Snowfall: None
Washington, DC: Mean Temperature: 43.1° (tied 12th warmest); Snowfall: Trace

All four cities wound up with among their warmest Januaries on record. Boston (5th warmest), New York City (1st warmest), Philadelphia (2nd warmest), and Washington, DC (3rd warmest).

Why have things gone so badly? Two possible issues may be involved:

1) His "analog" method

2) His approach to using the guidance

Analogs can provide useful insight when three conditions exist: they are selected in an objective fashion (different people should be able to reproduce them from a consistent methodology), their limitations (lack of synoptic scale value, sample size, uncertainty) are respected, and reasonable comparability exists (relatively stable climate) across the period of time. Today, the climate is warming and it is notably warmer than it was even a few decades ago. The dynamic warming and extent of warming that has occurred have undermined analog comparability and reduced valid analog pools to very small sample sizes.

His approach to using models and ensembles is flawed. He has often suggested that he arrives at conclusions and then chooses the guidance that favors those conclusions. Two or three decades ago when the guidance had much less skill, the hazards of that approach would have been less evident. The noise of model error would have drowned out the error from a flawed approach to using the models. Today, the hazards of that flawed approach are inescapable. In general, one should look at the evidence, including the guidance, and only then reach conclusions. One should not reach preconceived conclusions and then essentially filter evidence simply because it confirms one's ideas. Confirmation bias is lethal to good analyses and decision-making. It also undermines the possibility of utilizing lessons from post-verification assessments.

Overall, long-range forecasting remains a low-skill endeavor. However, an inherently flawed approach to forecasting can greatly increase the frequency and magnitude of one's errors. I suspect that's the bigger story here.

 

I quit reading JB after 2001-02

No one should have read anything written by him after that debacle.

 

[donsutherland1]

23 minutes ago, LibertyBell said:

I quit reading JB after 2001-02

No one should have read anything written by him after that debacle.

 

He used to be a good forecaster. Even the best ones can make big errors from time to time. He has changed dramatically since around 2010. 

I focused on the two big flaws that now appear apparent in his forecasting framework. I personally hope his better days from the past won’t be forgotten.